NAME OF THE COURSE MICROECONOMICS III								
Code	EUB303		Level of study 1					
Course teacher	Maja Pervan, Full Professor Josipa Višić, Associate Professor		Credits (ECTS) 5					
Associate teachers	rs		Type of instruction (number of hours)		L	S	E	F
					26		26	
Status of the course	Obligat	ory	Percentage of 30% application of e-learning					
COURSE DESCRIPTION								
Course objectives	The acquisition of knowledge and skills through examination and analytical elaboration of cooperative and non- cooperative oligopoly structure, static and dynamic models in the theory of games, as well as formulation and investigation of micro (economic) model.							
Course enrolment requirements and entry competences required for the course	Course signature requirements: as determined by the Statute of the Faculty of Economics and Rules and Regulations for Studies and Study Programmes.							
Learning outcomes expected at the level of the course (4 to 10 learning outcomes)	<ul> <li>dynamic models of the oligopolies, as well as to assess the possibility that firm can practice market power and make adequate strategic decisions.</li> <li>1. Analyse company's activity with the application of the game theory.</li> <li>2. Evaluate behaviour of various cooperative and non- cooperative oligopoly models</li> <li>3. Analyse different forms of firm's strategic behaviour</li> <li>4. Evaluate industrial concentration and firm market power</li> <li>5. Recommend appropriate decision under conditions of uncertainty and/or within alternative firm theory.</li> </ul>							
	Lectures Exercises:							
		Topic	Hours		Topic			Hours
	Oligopoly and game theory: foundations and principles, games classifications and Nash equilibrium		2	Oligopoly and foundations and classification equilibrium	<b>nd game theory:</b> and principles, games s and Nash		: ames	2
Course content broken down in detail by weekly	Game theory as a framework for understanding oligopolistic behaviour.		2	Game theory understandin behaviour.	as a framework for a oligopolistic		for	2
class schedule (syllabus)	Behaviour of cooperative and non-cooperative, as well as static and dynamic oligopoly models within the game theory framework.		e 2	Behaviour of non-cooperat and dynamic within the gat framework.	cooperative and tive, as well as static oligopoly models theory		2	
	Strate coope behav pricine Analy studie	egic behaviour: non erative strategic viour (predatory g, limit pricing). sis of empirical es.	2	Strategic be cooperative s (predatory pr Analysis of e	<b>haviour</b> strategic icing, lim mpirical	: non- behavio hit pricing studies.	ur g).	2

	Cooperative s behaviour.	strategic	2	Cooperative	e strategic behaviou	ır. 2
	Market power and dominant firms: sources of market power, identifying and measuring market power.			Market power and dominant firms: sources of market power, identifying and measuring market power.		
	Methods of co market power Competition A Gazette 79/09	ontrolling the of firms: Act (Official 9)	2	Methods of power of firm (Official Gaz	controlling the marl ns: Competition Ac zette 79/09)	ket t 2
	Measures of i concentration	ndustrial	2	Measures o concentration	f industrial on	2
	Classical mod	lel (Bain) vs.	1	Classical m	odel (Bain) vs.	1
	Risk and deci under uncerta Asymmetric ir	sion making inty. formation.	2	Risk and de uncertainty. information.	cision making unde Asymmetric	er 2
	Microeconom econometric: demand for fir and its costs. and testing th (economic) m	nics s: estimating m's products Formulating e micro odel.	2	Microecon estimating of products an Formulating micro(econd	omics econometri lemand for firm's d its costs. and testing the omic) model.	<b>cs:</b> 2
	Applying regre analysis, cros time-series m microeconom	ession s-section and odels in ics.	2	Applying rea cross-section models in m	gression analysis, on and time-series nicroeconomics.	2
	Traditional an theories of the maximization theory	d alternative e firm: profit and Baumol's	3 2	Traditional a theories of t maximizatio theory	and alternative he firm: profit n and Baumol's	2
	Marris's and V theories of the	Villiamson's e firm.	1	Marris's and of the firm.	d Williamson's theor	ries 1
Format of instruction	<ul> <li>☑ lectures</li> <li>□ seminars and</li> <li>☑ exercises</li> <li>□ on line in ent</li> <li>□ partial e-lear</li> <li>□ field work</li> </ul>	d workshops irety ning		<ul> <li>☑ independer</li> <li>□ multimedia</li> <li>□ laboratory</li> <li>□ work with n</li> <li>□ (otherwork)</li> </ul>	nt assignments nentor er)	
Student responsibilities	<ul> <li>In order to take a final exam, a student must meet the following two conditions: <ul> <li>achieve minimum attendance rate of 50%</li> <li>take self-evaluation tests (minimum 4 out of 6) that will be held during the semester.</li> </ul> </li> <li>In order to meet the condition for taking the <i>1st colloquium</i>, a student must take all self-evaluation tests held until the 1st colloquium. A positively graded 1st colloquium is a condition for taking the 2nd colloquium.</li> </ul>					
Screening student	Class	1 Re	search		Practical training	
proportion of ECTS	Experimental	Experimental Report			Self-evaluation	0,5*
activity so that the	tivity so that the Essay Seminar				(Other)	
	-	ess	bay			

ECTS credits is	Tests	3,5*	Oral exam		(Other)		
value of the course)	Written exam	3,5*	Project		(Other)		
Grading and evaluating student work in class and at the final exam	<ul> <li>* During the semester there will be two colloquiums. To obtain a final grade without exams, on each colloquium a student must solve at least 55% of the tasks / case studies as well as two out of the three theoretical questions. The final grade is derived as an arithmetic mean of the score achieved in the first and second colloquium. Students who do not pass the colloquiums take the exam in regular exam terms. The exam consists of two parts. In the first part of the exam, a student has to accurately and completely solve 55% of the tasks / case studies. Positive assessment in the first part of the exam also represents a condition of access to the second (theoretical) exam, where the student has to solve minimally two out of the three theoretical questions.</li> <li>By the decision of professors, the exam can also be held online via the Moodle platform and/or the Zoom application. In this case, students solve 9 numerical problems and a certain number of (theoretical) essay questions or questions with multiple choice answers.</li> </ul>						
	The total percentage obtained in exam, defines the final mark in a following way: 89 - 100 excellent (5) 78 - 88 very good (4) 66 - 77 good (3) 55 - 65 sufficient (2) 0 - 54 inadequate (1)						
		٢	<b>Fitle</b>		Number of copies in the library	Availability via other media	
	Perloff, J.M. "M	icroeconc	1	0			
	2018.						
Required literature (available in the library and via other media)	An Intuitive App 2017.	F. Advano proach wit	ced Microecon h Examples, N	omic Theory, IIT Press,	1	0	
Required literature (available in the library and via other media)	An Intuitive App 2017.	F. Advano proach wit	ced Microecon h Examples, N	omic Theory, IIT Press,	1	0	
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Required literature (available in the library and via other media)	2018. Muñoz-Garcia An Intuitive App 2017.	F. Advano proach wit	ced Microecon h Examples, N	omic Theory, IIT Press,	1	0	
Required literature (available in the library and via other media)	2018. Muñoz-Garcia An Intuitive App 2017.	F. Advano proach wit	ced Microecon h Examples, N	omic Theory, IIT Press,		0	
Required literature (available in the library and via other media) Optional literature (at the time of submission of study programme proposal)	Articles: 1. Pervar Union interna doi:10 2. Pervar Croatia Econo 981.	F. Advand proach wit proach wit () () () () () () () () () () () () ()	ak, M.; Pavić k the Efficiency of view of econ b-2021-0004 van I. i Ćurak acturing Indust arch-Ekonoms	omic Theory, IIT Press, IIT Press, Kramarić, T. I of Croatian In omics & bu M., Determin ry - Evidence ka Istraživanj	1         Has Accession         surance Comp         Isiness, 24 (2)         hants of Firm P         From Dynamic         a, Vol. 32, No	0 to the European anies? // Zagreb 2021), 1; 67-98 Profitability in the c Panel Analysis, 1, 2019. str 968-	
Required literature (available in the library and via other media) Optional literature (at the time of submission of study programme proposal) Quality assurance methods that	Articles: 1. Pervar Union interna doi:10 2. Pervar Croatia Econo 981. Registering stu (lecturer).	F. Advand proach wit proach wit () () () () () () () () () () () () ()	ak, M.; Pavić H the Efficiency of view of econ b-2021-0004 van I. i Ćurak acturing Indust arch-Ekonoms	omic Theory, IIT Press, IIT Press, Kramarić, T. H of Croatian In omics & bu M., Determin ry - Evidence ka Istraživanj	1         Has Accession         surance Comp         Isiness, 24 (2)         hants of Firm P         From Dynamic         a, Vol. 32, No	0 to the European anies? // Zagreb 2021), 1; 67-98 Profitability in the c Panel Analysis, 1, 2019. str 968- r duties	

acquisition of exit	Students' Performance analysis in each course (Vice Dean for Education).
competences	Student questionnaire on the quality of lecturers and lessons for each course
	(University of Split, Quality Assurance Centre)
	Examination is used as an instrument to evaluate individual course outcomes by the
	course lecturer. The content of exam is reassessed periodically in order to assure
	compliance with the course outcomes.
Other (as the	The course is taught in Croatian and English.
proposer wishes to	
add)	